Schröder's Ambivalent European Legacy

During his presumably last intimate fireside conversation with the press at the EU summit in Brussels in June, the German chancellor became truly melancholy. During his time in office, he matured into a convinced European, Schröder told the correspondents who always accused the SPD politician of being emotionally aloof. He said he always remained a realist who kept his feet firmly on the European ground.

Gerhard Schröder wanted clearly to set himself apart from his predecessor, Helmut Kohl, who always reduced Europe to the question of war and peace. Schröder, on the other hand, wanted to advance German interests in Europe at the least possible cost. Helmut Kohl was popular in Brussels and famous for having a soft European heart and a fat check-book, which helped him settle many a difference. Schröder lacked this charitable streak.

Turning away from Blair

Seven years ago, Schröder came to Brussels saying: We are somebody again and we want to reinforce our influence. During the 1998 election campaign, he was still stressing that Europe would not win anyone prizes in Germany, let alone election votes. In the course of his chancellorship, Schröder came increasingly closer to French President Jacques Chirac and his European position as he moved away from his initial political partner Tony Blair, the British prime minister.

Schröder and Chirac together put pressure on Brussels and implemented many of their ideas, such as eastern enlargement and accession perspectives for Turkey. During an EU summit, Schröder even stood in for Chirac during a session, they even stayed at the same hotel. EU diplomats were joking at the time that soon one would get to see the two guys hanging out, holding hands at the Grande Place in Brussels.

The Schröder-Chirac duo

In 2002, Schröder and Chirac single-handedly sealed the now controversial agrarian deal, which made the EU enlargement with 10 more states possible. Tony Blair, who was against the compromise to start with, took his revenge by letting the last summit fall through. By that time, Schröder and Chirac, weakened by their own internal political problems, could not assert themselves anymore.

Schröder is particularly rankled by Blair's victory. Now he speaks a lot and often about the "European project" that lies close to his heart. It's all about saving the European social model, since Europe is more than just a functioning market.

Schröder's poodle?

For Schröder, Europe was always a projection screen for populist attacks. It all started at the beginning of his term with a failed attempt to save the tax-free shopping in EU waters. It continued with the attacks on EU parliamentarians and their presumably high benefits.

During the election campaign in North Rhine-Westphalia, the European directive on services in the internal market, which was initially supported by the German government, had to be sacrificed. SPD election campaigners equated low wages and tax dumping with the EU, although the German government itself had agreed to all these regulations in the Council of Ministers.

Schröder always relied on his man in Brussels, the German EU commissioner and fellow Social Democrat Günter Verheugen, who earned the reputation of being Schröder's "poodle" among some of his colleagues in the EU capital. But the other commissioners also worked closely with their national governments. Schröder's attempt to turn Verheugen into a "super-commissioner" with several departments in the spring of 2004 was not successful. He trumpeted his wish all too openly and undiplomatically.

Continue reading about why smaller member states talked about the German steamroller and how Brussels reacted to Schröder's rejection of the Iraq war.

German steamroller and hit-and-run diplomacy

According to EU diplomats, the German influence has actually decreased over the past few years. Without many top insider positions, the German government opted more for hit-and-run diplomacy, trying to affect decisions with spontaneous actions when it was already too late.

Schröder relied all too frequently on Germany's size and the weight of its votes in the EU. Smaller EU states sometimes spoke cattily of the German steamroller. Even the German economics minister, Wolfgang Clement, who sent the most representatives to EU, showed little interest in the EU councils for competitiveness and economics.

The chancellor's role in the politics surrounding the Iraq conflict has been received ambivalently in Europe. Those who opposed the war, such as Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, have praised Schröder for standing up to the Americans and helping Europe gain more self-confidence in the long run. Those EU members who are more loyal to the US have argued, on the other hand, that Schröder's rigid attitude has brought the union to the brink of an abyss. The breakup of the EU seemed possible in February/March 2003. The division into Bush-warriors and Bush-opponents is still in effect.

Schröder's limited power

Schröder's years in Brussels will also be remembered by the watering down of the Stability and Growth Pact. Because German Finance Minister Hans Eichel could not satisfy the public debt criteria, he and his French colleagues decided to soften the criteria themselves.

In the summer of 2004, Schröder already had to endure a sensitive defeat on the European stage. He wanted to have the Verhofstadt elected president of the European Commission, most likely out of gratitude for the anti-Bush "chocolate coalition" during the Iraq war. But the candidate was not accepted by the majority of conservative state and government heads. This decision was engineered in the background by Angela Merkel, leader of the German Christian Democrats, who let Schröder feel her own influence on the European level.